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Inquisitions by Officials:
A Study of Due Process Requirements
in Administrative Investigations- III
The growing trend toward inquisitions by officials has
raised questions of the constitutional rights of persons
subpoenaed to appear before government investigators
and investigative bodies. After examining, in detail, the
practices and procedures of both federal (part I) and
state (part II) inquisitors,Mr. Rogge, in the third and
final part of his Article, suggests that the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments require
that the subpoenaed person be afforded the following
Tights: the right to counsel; the right of apprisal; the
right to receive a transcript of his testimony; and the
right of immunity fron prosecution for those offenses
aboutwhich he testifies.

0. John Rogge*
X. OUR OUTMODED GRAND JURY
The present inquisitional trend, which began a century ago,
has been accompanied by a marked de-emphasis of the grand
jury system. England, where the grand jury system had its early
development, if not its origin, and many of the 50 states have
abandoned its use. This may be a sad occurrence to some, but
the fact remains.
Agitation against the English grand jury began almost 150
years ago. As early as 1827, Bentham, in his Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, stated that the grand jury had outlived its usefulness
by 250 years.' Even grand jurors often criticized the "utter uselessness" of the system? In response to such pressures, and following a period during World War I when Parliament had suspended grand juries,3 in December, 1932, a committee was
appointed to consider, among other things, the question of abolishing grand juries. By 1933 the House of Lords, with none of
*TMember of the New York Bar.
1. 2 BzTH-,
RATIoNALn op JuDIrCAuL

EvImDxc , 313 (1827).

2. Quoted in Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29

J. Am. L sT. Cimr.L. &C. 3, 12 (1938).
3. Grand Juries (Suspension) Act, 1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 4.
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the Lords at any stage speaking against the measure, had passed
a bill recommending the abolition of the grand jury. 4 The Attorney General, in moving that the bill be read a second time, reasoned that since "grand juries are not serving any really useful
purpose and are at the same time very expensive and very troublesome to a large number of people . . . we ought to be prepared to abolish them."5 Even the opposition, in the person of
Sir Stafford Cripps, agreed with the government "that this archaic procedure has ceased to have any reality in modern days."
In fact, only one member of the Commons spoke against the proposal; he argued that the grand jury system provided a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary regulations of any new form
of government.7 Yet, his admonitions, and those of the laymen
who spoke against the abolition of the grand jury," were to no
avail-in 1933 the Commons abolished, with insignificant exceptions, grand juries in England. 9
The story in this country was a comparable one, with the
abandonment of the use of the grand jury beginning here over
a century ago. Michigan's constitution of 1850, the first inroad,
did not require a grand jury; and an 1859 Michigan statute gave
its courts "the same power and jurisdiction to hear, try, and
4. 88 HI,. Dna. (5th ser.) 814 (193).
5. 279 H.C. Dn. (5th ser.) 1601 (1933).
6. Id. at 1607.
7. Id. at 1622, 1623.
8. See Ellif, supra note 2, at 20. A correspondent to The Law Times, July
5, 1983 (evidently a grand juror at some point in his life) summed up the
situation this way:
Fleet Street, the Strand, and the Temple have decided that a Grand
Jury is an anachronism, a superfluity, a formality, a useless vestigal
remnant, a -third and paralysed arm of the law, a fifth wheel on the
legal coach, and we are about to be abolished in -the name of efficiency.
Quoted in id. at 20. One strong voice outside of Parliament, that of Professor
W. S. Holdsworth, still spoke up for the retention of the grand jury. On
July 13, 1933 he wrote The Law Times:
Ever since 1681, when the Ignoramus of a grand jury saved Lord
Shaftesbury from a trial for treason, it is clear that the grand jury
is capable of being a real safeguard of the liberties of the subject.
These liberties need safeguards even more today than they did in 1681,
because bureaucrats of Whitehall who dominate the CabineL which in
turn dominates the House of Commons, have established a more effectual and a more oppressive tyranny than the Stuarts ever succeeded
in establishing. We cannot in these days afford to lose one of our few
remaining securities for freedom of speech and action.
Ibid.
9. Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 &
24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1.
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determine prosecutions upoii information for crimes, misdemeanors and offences ... as they possess, and may exercise in
cases of like prosecutions upon indictment."' 0 Wisconsin empowered its courts similarly in 1871." The California constitution of
1879 provided: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination
and commitment by a Magistrate, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed
by law."
Today, 21 states make an information available as a substitute for a grand jury indictment for all criminal prosecutions,
and many of the rest permit a waiver of an indictment in all but
& 3 In some of the less-populous
capital or life-imprisonment cases.
western states, the grand jury never did become deeply rooted.
As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wyoming has written, "the grand jury system has never been employed in this
State as a practical matter"' 4 Or, as the Assistant Attorney of
Oklahoma explained more generally:
InOklahoma, as I think you will find in most western states, prosecution by information is the usual procedure for felonies as well as other
crimes. Although we still provide for grand juries in our statutes, their
use and resulting .prosecutions -by indictment are the exception to the
rule.... Although it is relatively easy to call a grand jury .... in

practice thek are seldom convened, and, -then, usually for the purpose
of investigating official misconduct of one form or another.15
10. Mich. Acts 1859, No. 138, § 1, at 391.
11. Wis. Laws 1871, ch. 137, § 1, at 202, following a state constitutional
amendment of the preceding year, Wis. CoxsT. arL 1, § 8. The act was sustained in Rowan v. State, S0 Wis. 129 (1872).
12. CAL. CoNsT. arL 1, § 8, upheld in Hurtado v. California, 110 US.
516 (1884); Killoch v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 229 (1880).
13. See Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Ezpesive Antique?,
37 N.C.L. REv. 290, 291 (1959). Minnesota, for example, by statute in Mlinn.
Laws 1905, cl. 231, § I -following a state constitutional amendment in 1904,
MuNw. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7, provided for informations as an alternative procedure
to indictments in certain specified cases; this provision now applies to all but
life-imprisonment cases.
14. Letter From Glenn Parker to 0. John Rogge, Feb. 16, 1963.
15. Letter From Hugh H. Collum to 0. John Rogge, Feb. 28, 1963.
The author received letters, all of which attested that indictment by information had virtually supplanted the grand jury, except in cases where a
grand jury was required, from the following Western-state officials: Philip B1.
Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona; E. T. Knudson, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Idaho; Thomas G. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General of Idaho; W. A. Dumars, Reporter of the Supreme Court of
Kansas; James T. Harrison, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Montana;
Paul W. White, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nebraska; Gerald S.
Vitamvas, Deputy Attorney General of Nebraska; Norman S. Thayer, As-
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The abandonment of the use of the grand jury, to a greater
or lesser extent, is by no means confined to the less-populous
western states. Maine, Vermont, Michigan, and Wisconsin, to
take other examples, have likewise done so. The Attorney General of Wisconsin has stated: "Although the Wisconsin Statutes
still provide for grand juries, they are practically obsolete in this
state since . . . the Wisconsin Constitution was amended in 1870
to permit prosecutions on informations."' 6 Of like tenor is a statement of the Attorney General of Vermont: "Most criminal prosecutions in Vermont are started by the information of a prosecuting attorney. Practically the only time grand juries are used are
in homicide cases when such proceedings are mandatory."'17 Strong
voices still speak up in defense of the grand jury system,' 8 particularly in the Supreme Court of the United States and in the state
of New York; nevertheless, with the continued growth of inquisitions by officials, the use of the grand jury will probably continue to decline.
In the face of this double trend, a witness subpoenaed to appear before inquisitional officials should, it will be shown, be
accorded four due process rights: counsel who is not confined to
ear-whispering; apprisal of the nature of the inquiry as well as
the subject matter about which he is to be questioned; a copy
of his testimony and of any documentary material he supplies;
and immunity from prosecution, unless he has knowingly waived
his right of silence.
sistant Attorney General of New Mexico; Wesley N. Harry, Special Assistant
Attorney General of North Dakota; Jack A. Swidensky, Assistant Attorney
General of Oklahoma; Charles S. Hanson, Presiding Judge of the Supreme
Court of South Dakota; Richard Hopewell, Assistant Attorney General of
South Dakota; F. Henri Henriod, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Utah; Richard B. Ott, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Washington:
Charles F. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General of Washington; Richard T.
Anderson, Assistant Attorney General of Wyoming.
16. Letter From George Thompson to 0. John Rogge, Feb. 18, 1963.
17. Letter From Charles E. Gibson, Jr. to 0. John Rogge, Feb. 13, 1963.
The author also received letters from Leland W. Carr, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Michigan and George C. West, Deputy Attorney General
of Maine, both indicating that indictment by information is widely used in
their respective states. Four decades earlier Professor, later Judge, R. Justin
Miller in an article in the Minnesota Law Review published excerpts from a
comparable collection of letters. Miller, Informations or Indictments in Felony
Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV. 379, 879-80 n.6 (1924).
18. Much has been written about grand juries. A select list of articles, in
addition to those already cited, includes: McClintock, Indictment by a Grand
Jury, 26 MiNx. L. REV. 153 (1942); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury
System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 101, 217, 295 (1931); Note, The Grand Jury as an
Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590 (1961).
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In suggesting these four due process rights for subpoenaed
witnesses, there is no thought of curbing or reversing the current
inquisitional trend. If the way of the future is inquisitions by
officials, so be it. Nor is there in this suggestion any demand, such
as counsel made in Hannah v. Larche,9 for confrontation and
cross-examination, as well as apprisal, in administrative investigations. Although confrontation is a sixth amendment right along
with apprisal, there is no attempt here to extend it to inquisitions
by officials. Let these investigations be sweeping, and let the inquisitors proceed in a truly unhampered, expeditious and effective manner.
The only concern here is to safeguard to individuals subpoenaed to appear before executive or administrative investigators
rights comparable to those which they had when grand juries
were the accusers and our officials did not have inquisitional powers. England, despite the fact that it has abandoned the use of
the grand jury, has done a better job than we have of securing
to individuals a certain area free from intrusion by official
inquisitors.
XI. MODERN ENGLISH PRACTICE
Those who mourn the passing of the grand jury in England
may take some comfort from the habitual restraint which official inquisitors in England exercise in their preliminary questioning of suspects or accused persons. Lapses do occur,20 but they
would appear to be exceptional.
In 1848 Parliament passed a statute that specifically required
a justice of the peace to advise an accused person of his right to
remain silent in a preliminary examination. The act provided
that the justice of the peace
19. 363 U.S. 420 (1960); see Rogge, Inquisitions by Official: A Study of
Due Process Requirements in Administrative Investigations-1 , 47 M'N. L.
Rzv. 939, 942 (1963). See also Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 Mica. L. Rnv. 169, 175-76
(1961).

20. For example, "Change in the Rules?," The Economist, Nov. 9, 1963 (air

ed.), p. 548, col. 2, an Article about the Judges' Rules began with this paragraph:
Lord Shaweross this week in Leeds condemned the "kid glove methods" supposed to be used against criminals -by the English police and
judiciary. The following day, a monstrous tale of police brutality
emerged from nearby Sheffield. A Home Office tribunal of inquiry, set
up to hear the appeals of two detective constables against their dismissal from the Sheffield police force for using (among other things)
a rhinoceros-hide whip on suspects, not only found their dismissal fully
confirmed, but implicated more senior officers as well.
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shall say to him these Words, or Words to -the like Effect: "Having
heard the Evidence, do you wish to say anything in answer to the
Charge? you are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do
so, but whatever you say will be taken down in Writing, and may be
given in Evidence against you upon your Trial."2 1

In 1912 the judges, at the request of the Home Secretary, drew
up some rules

-

known as the Judges' Rules -

as guides for

police officers. They provided, in part:
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge a person
with a crime -he should first caution such person before asking any
questions or any further questions as the case may be.
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being first administered.
4. If the prisoner wishes22to volunteer any statement the usual caution
should be administered.

The Judges' Rules, while not absolute requirements, form the
standard for evaluating police practices. Subsequently, other
rules were added. The first sentence of rule 7, the most important
of these rules, specifies: "A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be cross-examined, and no questions should be
put to him about it except for the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has actually said." 3
Other law-enforcement officials also adopted rules of conduct
2]. The Indictable Offences Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. 215, c. 42, § 18. In
1793, over a half-century before this statute, the court excluded an examination 'before a magistrate where the accused had refused to sign it. The judge
reasoned that the accused 'had a right "to retract what he had said, and to
say that it was false." The King v. Lambe, 2 Leach 552, 553 n.(a), 108 Eng.
Rep. 879 n.(a) (Assizes 1791). In 1817 still more than three decades before
this statute, Chief Baron Richards in Rex v. Wilson, Holt 597, 171 Eng. Rep.
353 (Assizes 1817), excluded an examination before a magistrate where the
accused had not been cautioned, saying: "An examination of itself imposes
an obligation to speak the truth. If a -prisoner will confess, let him do so
voluntarily." Id. at 597, 171 Eng. Rep. at 353. In a similar ruling in 1860,
after this statute but without a reference to it, Chief Justice Wilde in Regina
v. Pettit, 4 Cox Crim. Cas. 164 (1850), in rejecting such an examination, declared: "I reject it upon the general ground that magistrates have no right
to put questions to a prisoner with reference to any matters having a bearing
upon the charge upon which he is brought 'before them. The law is so extremely cautious in guarding against anything like torture, that it extends
a similar principle to every case where a man is not a free agent in meeting
an inquiry." Id. at 165.
22. Memorandum by His Majesties Judges of 'the King's Bench Division,
Police Enquiries, Oct. 1, 1912 printed in The King v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B.
531, 539 n.3.
23. Royal Comm'n on Police Powers and Procedure, Report, CMD No.
3297, at 70-71 n.* (1929), quoted in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
596 n.41 (1961).
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designed to protect the rights of criminal defendants. In 1929 a
Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures, which had
been appointed the preceding year, made a report in which it
recommended, among other things:
A rigid instruction should -be issued to the Police that no questioning
of a prisoner, or a '"person in custody," about any crime or offense with
which he is, or may be, charged, should -be permitted. This does not
exclude questions to remove elementary and obvious ambiguities in
voluntary statements, under No. (7) of the Judges' Rules, but the prohibition should cover all persons who, although not2 4in custody, have
been charged and are out on bail while awaiting trial.

A case and an anecdote will illustrate the English approach.
In the case, a woman was on trial with another for the murder
of her husband. At the time of her arrest she admitted her guilt
and identified the murder weapon. The arresting officer had not
followed up these statements with any questions, and when defense counsel asked him why not, this colloquy took place:
Mr. Justice Humphreys: Do you really suggest, Air. O'Connor, if after
a woman has said-believe it or not-that she was a party to a
crime like this, the police officer would -be justified in cross-examining
her at all?
Mr. O'Connor: I accept your lordship's suggestion at once, and apologLse 'for the question. 2 5

The anecdote concerns a British constable on the witness stand
who was asked whether it was true that the accused had made
a statement. He answered: "No: he was beginning to do so; but
I knew my duty better, and I prevented him.""
XII. MODERN FRENCH PRACTICE
Even France, where the inquisitional system had its initial
secular development, in 1897 gave an accused person the right
to be represented by counsel whenever the Juge d'Instruction
questioned him. M. Constans, one of the sponsors of the law in
the French Senate, said:
The juge d'instruction is like other functionaries. He must be controlled ....

The presence of the lawyer will of itself . .. prevent him

-7
from doing anything but his duty.

24. Royal Comm'n on Police Powers and Procedure, supra note 3, at 118.
25. JEsSE, TRIAL OF Aizu VIcToRA RATTENmury & GEORGE PERcr
STOMMx 126-27 (Notable British Trials Series 1935).
26. FoRsrTH, THE HisoRy OF LAwERns 282 n.1 (1875), quoted in
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 598 n.46 (1961).
27. Quoted in Ploscowe, Development of Inquisitorial and Accusatorial
Elements in French Procedure,n J. Canm. L., C. &PS. 372, 381 (1932), and
in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 351-52 n.32 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
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The Juge d'Inst'uction was required to inform an accused not
that he had a right to remain silent, but that he had a right to
be defended by counsel and that he need not answer questions
until counsel was present. Yet counsel, when present, had only
limited rights. He was entitled to speak only when the Juge
d'Instruction authorized him to do so, although a refusal was

to be noted in the minutes. The Juge d'Instruotion was still free
to try to get a confession.
Today in France under articles 114 and 118 of the Code of
Penal Procedure, which went into effect on March 2, 1959, an
accused before a Juge d'Instruction not only has a right to counsel but also is excused from taking an oath to tell the truth. In
the words of Professor Robert Vouin of the University of Paris:
In France, the suspected person enjoys an effective proteotion as
soon as he is brought before the examining magistrate as an accused.
From that time, actually, he is not only excused from taking an oath
to tell the truth, but also he may require the -help of a barrister. The
latter must be convoked by the judge to every interrogatory, permitted
to study the briefing,28and allowed to communicate freely with his client
any time he desires.

X1II. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
1. Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment to the Constitution guarantees: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Although the
first ten amendments were not intended to be applicable to the
states,29 the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which went into effect in 1868, has absorbed such of the specifics
of the first eight amendments as are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"30 and made them applicable to the states. This
includes the right to the assistance of counsel.
28. Vouin, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations Under Foreign
Law, 52 J. Cani. L., C. & P.S. 47, 57 (1961). Professor Vouin continued with
the comment: "As these protections do not facilitate their task, the examnining magistrate and the police might be tempted to put off their application.
delaying as long as possible the time when the suspected person is the object
of a formal inculpation. But the jurisprudence has reacted against this trend
by formulating a rule that the Penal Procedure Code has just adopted." Ibid.
Under article 70 of Code of Penal Procedure, the Procurctr de la
Republique may subpoena any person suspected of having participated in
a flagrant crime; 'but this person, "if he reports himself, accompanied by a
defence counsel .... may be interrogated only in the presence of the latter."
As quoted in id. at 58.
29. See Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
30. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
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The leading case on the right to counsel under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause is Powell v. Alabama,3 1 which
arose out of the Scottsboro prosecution. There Justice Sutherland
wrote for the Supreme Court:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily
to refuse to hear a party 'by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a
denial3 2of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional
senLse

Since then, a long line of decisions makes plain that every defendant in every state criminal case, whether capital or noncapital,
is entitled to be represented by counsel of his own choosing. A
recent case, Chandler v. Fretagss is illustrative. The defendant
had pleaded guilty to a house breaking and larceny charge, but
when he found that this also involved him in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment under the Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act, he requested a continuance to enable him to obtain
counsel for the habitual criminal accusation. The state court denied his request. The-Supreme Court reversed, unanimously ruling, through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, that "regardless of whether
petitioner would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel,
34
his right to be heard through his own counsel was unqualified.

Courts may in no way impair this right to independent counsel of one's own choice. For example, in Glasserv. United States,"
a federal prosecution involving several defendants, the Supreme
Court held that the trial judge's assignment of counsel selected
by one defendant to represent another defendant was a violation
of the sixth amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel.
The Court, speaking through Justice Murphy, reasoned:
Glasser wished .the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of
his own choice. We think that such a desire on the part of an accused
should 'be respected ... .The right to have the assistance of counsel
is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denia. 30

31. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
82. Id. at 69.
33. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
34. Id. at 9. In Reickauer v. Cunningham, 299 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir.
196-2), the court, referring to counsel of one's choice, wrote: "This -right is
absolute and no showing of special circumstances is necessary." In Andrews
v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1944), the court observed: "The
State Court has no right under the Constitution, to deny a defendant the
right to counsel of his own choosing."

35. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
36. Id. at 75-76.
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Another illustrative case is Releford v. United States,87 in which
the attorney retained by the defendant became ill and could not
attend the trial. The district judge, instead of granting the defendant a continuance to secure substitute counsel, insisted, contrary to the defendant's wishes, that the attorney who shared
offices with the attorney retained by the defendant serve as his
counsel. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held for the defendant, because "where such a person is able to obtain counsel for himself
and does not ask the court to appoint counsel, he must be given
a reasonable time and a fair opportunity to secure counsel of
his own choice."'8
As the Releford case indicates, a defendant is entitled to a
reasonable amount of time to obtain counsel and to consult with
him. Language in Powell v. Alabama supports this idea,80 and
in Chandler v. Fretag the Court stated that "a defendant must
be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with
counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of
little worth.1 40 In addition, counsel must have adequate time and
opportunity to prepare his client's defense. As the Supreme Court
stated in Hawk v. Olson,4 1 "the defendant needs counsel and
counsel needs time. 42
Furthermore, one who stands accused is entitled to private
consultations with his counsel.48 In Coplon v. United States," the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed Judith Coplon's conviction
because the government wiretapped the communications between
her and her lawyer. The court ruled that this deprived her of the
37. 288 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1961).
38. Id. at 301.
39.
It is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded,
a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel

of his own choice.
287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and
encouraged. But in reaching that result a defendant, charged with a
serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time
to consult with counsel and prepare his defense.
Id. at 59.
40. 348 U.S. 8, 10 (1954); accord, House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945);

Tinkle v. United States, 254 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1958).
41. 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
42. Id. at 278; accord, White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Tinkle v.

United States, 254 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d
616 (3d Cir. 1947); Walleck v. Hudspeth, 128 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1942); Jones
v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
43. See Yung v. Coleman, 5 F. Supp. 702, 703 (D. Idaho 1934).
44. 191 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
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effective and substantial aid of counsel, in violation of the fifth
amendment's guarantee of due process and the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions, saying: "The prosecution is not entitled to have a representative
present to hear the conversations of accused and counsel." '
Nor, in the federal courts, is a criminal defendant's untrammeled right to counsel of his own choice limited to members of
the local bar. He can select counsel from some other jurisdiction,
so long as that counsel is a duly qualified member of some accredited bar. For example, in United States v. Bergamo,4 where
Pennsylvania defendants selected New Jersey counsel, the Third
Circuit ruled: "To hold that defendants in a criminal trial may
not be defended by out-of-the-district counsel selected by them
is to vitiate the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.1 4 T State
courts as a matter of practice often reach the same result on a
pro /ao vice theory. 8
In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to the assistance of
counsel throughout the proceedings. As the Court stated in Powell
v. Alabama, "he requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him.'49 When a federal district
court "advisedly accepted for itself the duty of representing the
defendant upon the return of the verdict, and fully discharged
that responsibility," the Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed,

saying:
Assuming that a court can adequately represent the defendant at any
step of a contested criminal trial, that is not a substitute for, nor can
it -be taken in satisfaction of, the constitutional requirement that one
charged with crime is entitled to the benefit of counsel who will devote
his undivided energies solely and exclusively to the performance of
these functions.50
45. Id. at 795.
46. 154 F2d s1 (3d Cir. 1946).

47. Id. at 35.
48. In Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 Fad 119 (Sd Cir. 1950), the court held,
with reference to members of the New York bar admitted pro hac vice in a
state criminal prosecution in New Jersey, that "their standing with respect
to this case was no different from that of any other regularly admitted local
lawyer." Id. at 123. In .the preceding .paragraph of its opinion the court had
observed:
... And -they were admitted pro hac vice in accordance with a custom that was apparently recognized as early as 1629 by English judges
of Common Pleas. This custom of permitting the appearance of outof-state lawyers had become "general" and "uniform" in the United
States as early as 1876....

Id. at 122.
49. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
50. Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F-ad 834, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1946).
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Not only does every person in every proceeding, civil as well
as criminal, state as well as federal, have the absolute and unqualified right to obtain independent counsel of his own choice,
but also every criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel whether he requests it or not. For the federal
courts, Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure covers
the assignment of counsel:
If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every
stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or

is able to obtain counsel.
At one time the right to the assignment of counsel was not as
extensive in state as in federal criminal prosecutions. Although
every defendant in state capital cases, as well as every defendant
in state noncapital cases "where the circumstances show that his
rights could not have been fairly protected without counsel, ' ' "U
was entitled to have counsel assigned to him whether he asked
for it or not, this was not true in state noncapital cases where
the refusal or failure to appoint counsel did not result in fundamental unfairness. This was Betts v. Brady 2 But at the las Supreme Court term, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 8 the Court unceremoniously overruled Betts v. Brady. Now, all defendants in all
criminal prosecutions, in state as well as federal courts, in noncapital as well as capital cases, have the right to counsel: in the
federal courts under the specific provision for "the Assistance of
Counsel" of the sixth amendment as well as the due process
clause of the fifth, and in the state courts under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Gideon, Mr. Justice Black
wrote for the Court: "The right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
'54
trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
Twenty-three states and commonwealths by their attorneys
general filed a brief amici curiae on behalf of the petitioner asking
the Court to overrule Betts v. Brady. The attorneys general in
the conclusion of their brief amici declared:
51. Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118 (1956).
52. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. Id. at 344. Gideon on a retrial, with the benefit of counsel, was acquitted. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 2, cols. 2-4. On where to draw the line
between crimes and petty offenses, see Kamisar & Choper, The Right to
Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations,
48 MrINN. L. REv. 1, 62-88 (1963).
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Betts v. Brady, already an anachronism when handed down, has
spawned twenty years of bad law. That in the world of today a man
may be condemned to penal servitude for lack of means to supply
counsel for -his defense is unthinkable. We respectfully urge that the
conviction below be reversed, that Betts v. Brady be reconsidered, and
that this Court require that all .persons tried for a felony in a state
court shall have the right to counsel as a matter of due process of law
and of equal protection of the laws.s

The Court agreed."'
The Supreme Court's insistence on the right to counsel has
been such that at each recent term the Court has set aside a num-

ber of convictions because defendants have been denied the effec57
tive assistance of counsel. At the 1960 term, Ferguson v. Georgia,

Reynolds v. Cochran, and McNeal 'v. Cudver,5 91 were decided.
In Ferguson the Court held that a Georgia practice which allowed a criminal defendant to make an unsworn statement but
denied him the aid of counsel's questioning while making it unconstitutionally deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. This case arose out of the fact that Georgia retained the old
common-law rule that a defendant in a criminal case could not
be sworn on his own behalf. Justices Frankfurter and Clark would

have gone further than the rest of the Court: they would have
held that this old rule itself violated the fourteenth amendment's

due process clause. Mr. Justice Clark characterized it "as an un''0
satisfactory remnant of an age gone by."

Reynolds involved a second-offender statute. The defendant
asked for a continuance to enable his lawyer to attend the proceedings. The Criminal Court of Polk County, Florida, denied
his request. The Supreme Court reversed, overruling the state's
contention that the denial of the defendant's motion for a continuance was harmless error. The Court, in an unanimous opinion
by Mr. Justice Black, said:
The argument offered in support of this contention is that since petitioner admitted the only fact at issue in the proceeding- that he had
been convicted of a previous felony in 1934 as charged in the informa55. Brief for the State Governments Amied Curiae, pp. 24-25. The states
and commonwealths as listed were Massachusetts, Mmnesota, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Washington, West Virginia, and Alaska, for a total of 22. The state of New
Jersey was omitted by inadvertence and added later.
56. 372 U.S. at 345.
57. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
58. 365 U.S. 525 (1961).
59. 365 U-S. 109 (1961).
60. 365 US. at 602.
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tion -a lawyer would have been of no use to him. We find this argument totally inadequate to meet the decision in Chandler. Even assuming, which we do not, that the deprivation to an accused of the
assistance of counsel when that counsel has -been privately employed
could ever be termed "harmless error," it is clear that such deprivation
was not harmless under the facts as presented in this case .... 01

In a footnote, Mr. Justice Black added:
It is significant that in Chandler we did not require any showing that
the defendant there would have derived any particular benefit from the
62
assistance of counsel.
8
The cases decided at the 1961 term were Carnley v. Cochran,"
Chewning v. Cunningham, and Hamilton v. Alabama." In Hamilton the Court reversed an Alabama murder conviction because
the petitioner did not have counsel at his arraignment, quoting
the language from Powell v. Alabama to the effect that such an
accused needed the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. 66
At the last term there were, in addition to Gideon v. Wainwright, " White v. Maryland"' and Douglas v. California." In
White the Court, following Hamilton, upset a Maryland murder
conviction because the accused did not have counsel at his preliminary hearing.
In Douglas, decided the same day as Gideon, the Court vacated a California conviction on the ground that the two defendants there involved were entitled to counsel on an appeal which
they had as of right, even though the California District Court
of Appeal stated that it had "gone through" the record and had
come to the conclusion that "no good whatever could be served
70
by the appointment of counsel.
At the present term there have already been a dozen comparable rulings. In Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,71 involving 10
Florida prisoners who were convicted without counsel prior to
the Gideon ruling, and Newsome v. North Carolina,2 the Court

61. 365 U.S. at 531.
62. Id. at 531 n.12.
63. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
64. 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
65. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
66. Id. at 54.
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
68. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
69. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
70. 187 Cal. App. 2d 802, 812, 10 Cal. Rep. 188, 195 (1961).
71. 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
72. 375 U.S. 21 (1963).
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vacated judgments of conviction with the indication that it might
even apply the Gideon ruling retroactively. In Daegele v. Kansas" it indicated similarly with reference to its holding in Douglas
v. California.
The basic theories of our judicial system demand protection
of the right to independent counsel. This is hardly the time either
to deprive witnesses subpoenaed to appear before an executive
or administrative inquisitor of the right to counsel altogether, or
to cut down the role of such counsel to ear-whispering. An excerpt
from the record in FCC v. Schreiber,74 in which the Ninth Circuit
recently did limit counsel to ear-whispering, demonstrates what
can happen when counsel, although permitted to accompany his
client, is so confined.
Chief Hearing Examiner: May I interrupt you, sir. Let me ask
whether you are satisfied that, generally spealing, television programs
are not having adverse effects on any segments of the population, particularly teenagers?
Mr. Morris: I don't consider myself qualified to answer that question, sir.
Chief Hearing Examiner: Have you given it any thought, sir, in
connection with your work? I assume you must have.
Mr. Morris: Yes, a very great deal.
Chief Hearing Examiner: You have no view to give the Commis-

sion in that .behalf?
Mr. Morris: May I consult with counsel?
Chief Hearing Examiner: I see no reason why counsel should be
consulted ona thing of -thiskind. There is no legal question presented.
You have reviewed, over a period of 14 months, some 300 plays being
produced and readied for consumption by the -public.
Now, you must have some views, you must have given it thought
and considerable time. What do you say 'here now-without consulting
counsel? You don't need the advice of counsel to answer a question
like thaL75

On the contrary, counsel should have the right to make objections, to advise his client, and, when the inquisitor has finished
with his interrogation, to conduct his own examination of his
client to the end that the subpoenaed witness may present his
account as best it suits him and his counsel. Of the multitude of
inquisitorial agencies we have studied, two show a proper regard
in their procedures of the right to counsel in investigative proceedings: the Arkansas State Sovereignty Commission; and the
73. 375 U.S. 1 (1963); accord, Shockey v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 22 (1903).
74. 201 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Cal. 1962), modified and affirmed, 329 F.2d 517

(9th Cir. 1964).
75. Quoted in brief for Respondents, pp. 33-34.
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Hawaii Commission on Subversive Activities. The Arkansas act
provides:
Witnesses at Commission hearings shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel, of their own choosing, who shall have the right to
advise witnesses of their rights and to make -brief objections to the
relevancy of questions and to procedure.... Every witness who testifies in a hearing shall have a right to make an oral statement and to
file a sworn statement which shall be made a part of the transcript of
such hearing, but such oral
or written statement shall be relevant to
76
the subject of the hearing.

Hawaii has a comparable statutory provision:
The commission shall adopt proper rules to provide:
(b) That witnesses will -have the right to be accompanied by counsel,
-permitted to advise the witness while on the stand of his rights;
(c) That witnesses may be permitted reasonable opportunity at the
conclusion of the examination by the commission to supplement their
testimony in writing on matters with regard to which they have been
previously examined...7

These provisions, unfortunately, are exceptions.
Nevertheless, our course as "a maturing society" 7 has been
to enlarge the role of counsel, not to restrict it. Nowhere is this
fact better illustrated than in the brief amici of the attorneys
general of 23 states and commonwealths in Gideon v. Wainwright.
If they could say, as they did, that Betts v. Brady was already
an anachronism when it was decided, then the time has come
when with the same approach we can give a due process right
to counsel to individuals subpoenaed before official inquisitors in
investigative proceedings. In re Groban" and Anonymous v.
Bakers - both sanctioning secret inquisitional proceedings from

which counsel for subpoenaed witnesses are excluded -

should

76. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 6-812 (Supp. 1963).
77. HAWAn Rav. LAWS ch. 361, § 361-5 (1955).
78. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.,
joined by Black, J., Douglas, J., and Whittaker, J.), quoted in Rudolph v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.and Brennan, J.) (denial of certiorari); cf. Massiah v. United States, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 4389, 4391 (U.S. May 18, 1964), in which the Supreme Court
held that an indicted defendant was denied his sixth amendment right to
counsel "when there was used against him at his trial evidence of -his own
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him
after -he had been indicted and in the absence of 'his counsel."
79. 352 U.S. 330 (1957); see Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of
Due Process Requirements in Administrative Investigations- II, 48 MINN.
L. REv. 557, 558-59 (1964).
80. 360 U.S. 987 (1959); see Rogge, supra note 19, at 558-59.
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both be overruled as unceremoniously as Betts v. Brady was, the
next time the question presents itself21

2.

Right of Apprisal

The right of apprisal is one of the fundamental concepts of
Anglo-American justice. It is embodied in the sixth amendment
to the Constitution, which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.... !" If necessary, confrontation could
be sacrificed in the interest of expediency in administrative investigations; but the right of apprisal should be extended to such proceedings, and six recent Supreme Court decisions, Watkins v.
United Satee, Deutsch v. United States,&s Rvssell v. United
States,"' (--zmman io.United States," Silber v. United States,s"
and Hartman v. United States, 7 involving eleven individuals,
furnish supporting analogies for a due process right of apprisal
in administrative investigations.
In all these cases the Court upset judgments of conviction for
contempt of Congress. The contempts consisted of refusals to
answer questions either of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee or of a subcommittee of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities. The relevant statute made it an offense to
refuse "to answer any question pertinent to the question under
inquiry."ss In Watkins the Court reversed a judgment of conviction with instructions to dismiss the indictment because the
petitioner was not apprised of the pertinency of the questions at
the time he was called upon to answer them. AMr. Chief Justice
Warren in the Court's opinion wrote:
81. On June 4, 1963 Senator Everett M. Dirksen from Illinois, for himself end Senator Edward V. Long from Missouri, introduced a bill, S. 1603,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), which -rewrites the Administrative Procedure
Act. 109 CoNG. REc. 9379 (daily ed. June 4, 1963). This bill revises the first
sentence of section 6(a) to read: "Any person appearing voluntarily or involuntarily before any agency or representative thereof in the course of an
investigation or in any agency proceeding shall -be accorded the right to be
accompanied, .represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the
agency, by other qualified representative."
82. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
83. 867 US. 456 (1961).
84. 869 US. 749 (1962).
85. 370 US. 288 (1962).
86. 370 U.S. 717 (1962).
87. 370 U.S. 724 (1962).
88. 54 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 US.C. § 192 (1958).
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Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable
clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the
witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject
under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded
questions are pertinent thereto. To be meaningful, the explanation
must describe what -the topic under inquiry is and the connective rcasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate to it.80

The Chief Justice stated that the Court was mindful of the complexities of modern government and of the need of Congress for
information, but added:
Equally mindful are we of the indispensable function, in the exercise
of 'that -power, of congressional investigations ....
that are conducted .by use of compulsory process that give rise to a need to protect
the rights of individuals against illegal encroachment. That protection
can -be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the separation of power from responsibility and which provide .the constitutional
requisites of fairness for witnesses. 90
89. 354 U.S. at 214-15.
90. Id. at 215; accord, Knowles v. United States, 280 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir1960) (Mrs. 'Mary Knowles, the librarian of a library operated by the Quakers
of Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania); Watson v. United States, 280 F.2d 689
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (Mrs. Goldie E. Watson, a Philadelphia school teacher);
Singer v. United States, 247 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Professor Marcus
Singer of Cornell University); cf. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963)
(conviction of Edward Yellin, a graduate student in engineering at the
University of Illinois, reversed because a subcommittee of the House Coinmittee on Un-American Activities had not complied with the Committee's own
rules); Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 353 (1959) (the purposes of an inquiry of
the Legislative Investigative Committee of the Virginia General Assembly, as
announced by its chairman, "were so unclear, in fact conflicting, that Scull
did not have an opportunity of understanding the basis for the questions or
any justification on the part of the Committee for seeking the information
he refused to give"); Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958) (the Court
decided that the questions put to Harry Sacher, a New York lawyer, were
not clearly pertinent to the subject on which a subcommittee of the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee had been authorized to take testimony);
Brewster v. United States, 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 858 U.S.
842 (1958) (the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, usually known as the McCarthy Committee,
had exceeded its authority); United States v. Yarus, 198 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (the court acquitted Martin Yarus, n actor known professionally as George Tyne, 'because the government could not introduce
sufficient competent evidence of the authority of a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities to conduct an investigation); United
States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956) (where the court acquitted
Leon J. Kamin, a research assistant in Harvard's Department of Social Relations, on the ground that the McCarthy Committee 'had exceeded its
authority).
In Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1961), the court had
this comment on a revenue agent's failure to advise a taxpayer that a civil
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In Deutsch the Court reversed because the government did
not prove the pertinency of the questions put at petitioner's trial.
As our cases make dear, two quite different issues regarding per-

tinency may be involved in a prosecution under 2 U.S.C. § 192. One

issue reflects the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment that the pertinency of the interrogation -to the topic under
the congressional committee's inquiry must e brought home to the
witness at the time the questions are put to 'him.... The other and
different pertinency issue stems -from the -prosecution's duty at the trial
to prove that the questions propounded by the congressional committee
were in fact "pertinent to the question under inquiry" by the committee.9 1
audit to determine tax liability -had become a search for evidence of fraud:
It would of course be far preferable, so that it may be made certain
that the choice of the taxpayer be an informed choice, that written
warning be given when the civil audit is suspended as such, and the
investigation becomes one to determine whether criminal or civil fraud
penalties should be sought by the government. This would not only
protect the taxpayer's constitutional rights, but also obviate much of
the delay in tax cases caused by such motions as the one before us.
Id. at 228.
91. 367 U.S. at 467-68; accord, O'Connor v. United States, 240 F.2d 404
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (Harvey O'Connor, an author); Bowers v. United States,
202 Fad 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (George L. Bowers, who refused to answer
questions of a subcommittee of the Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, frequently known as the
Kefauver Committee); United States v. Peck, 154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957)
(Seymour Peck, an employee of The New York Times). In the O'Connor
case the court stated:
We pointed out that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is a personal privilege which must be seasonably asserted, else it is waived, but that pertinency of the question is an
essential element of the crime of contempt and must -be proved at the
trial. It is true that pertinency is made an essential element by the
statute defining the crime, while definiteness is not.... But the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution makes definiteness an essential
element of every crime. For this reason, definiteness as well as pertinency, must appear at the trial itself.
O'Connor v. United States, supra at 405-06.
Between the Watkins and Deutsch cases came Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). This case involved a judgment of conviction
under 54 Stat. 94- (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958) against Lloyd Barenblatt,
an instructor at Vassar College, who refused to answer questions of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. But the Court
affirmed. In the Barenblatt and Deutsch decisions the Court divided five to
four. In the Barenblatt case the dissenters were Xr. Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan; in the Deutsch case they were
Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker. On the differences in the
Court's approach in the Watdns and Barenblatt decisions, see Slotnick, Te
CongressionalInvestigating Power: Ramifications of the Watkins-Barenblatt
Enigma, 14 U. M mn L. 1Ev. 381 (1960).
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In the rest of the cases, the Court reversed because the indictments did not identify the subjects under inquiry at the times the
defendants were recalcitrant. The indictments were all in the
terms of the statute - they alleged that the questions which the
defendants refused to answer "were pertinent to the question
then under inquiry."92 The Court held all of them insufficient.
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, referred in passing
to the distinction he had drawn for the Court in Deutach, between the issue of pertinency there involved and the one involved
in Watkin. 93 He commented that the constitutional provision
for indictment by a grand jury "reflects centuries of antecedent
development of common law, going back to the Assize of Clarendon in 1166."*4 He concluded that
The vice which inheres in the failure of an indictment under 2
U.S.C. § 192 to identify the subject under inquiry is thus the violation
of the basic principle "that -the accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the nature of the accusation
against 'him. . ... 95

If a recalcitrant witness subpoenaed in a congressional investigation is entitled to be advised of the pertinency of the questions
put to him at the time he is asked them, to an indictment (in the
event there is one) which identifies the subject under inquiry,
and, at his trial, to proof of the pertinency of these questions, an
explanation which describes "what the topic under inquiry is and
the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked
relate to it""6 would seem to be warranted as a matter of due
process in administrative investigations.
92. 369 U.S. at 752.
93. On this point he wrote: "In the Watkins case the Court's primary
concern was not whether pertinency had been proved at the criminal trial,
but whether the petitioner had -been apprised of the pertinency of the questions at the time he -had been called upon to answer them. These two issues
are, of course, quite different. See Deutsch v. United States, 367 U.S. at 467468 ....
But identification of the subject under inquiry is essential to the

determination of either issue. See Barenblatt v. United States, S0 U.S. at
123-125. . . ." 369 U.S. at 759 n.9.
94. Id. at 761.
95. Id. at 766; accord, Popper v. United States, 806 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.
1962) (Martin Popper, a New York lawyer); cf. United States v. Sceger, 303
F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1962) (the court held the indictment of Peter Seeger, a
folk singer, insufficient for failure to allege that an inquiry of a subcommittee

of the House Committee on Un-American Activities was within the scope
of its authority); United States v. Laimont, 236 Fd 812 (2d Cir. 1956),
affirming 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (the court ruled similarly with reference to indictments of recalcitrant witnesses 'before the McCarthy Committee).
96. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957).

1964] "

INQUISITIONS BY OFFICIALS

1101

True, these six cases involve judgments of conviction under
indictments by a grand jury, but the recalcitrance of subpoenaed
witnesses in administrative investigations often constitute con0 7 they did. True,
tempts or offenses without more. In In re Grobar.
under the relevant statute the offenses consisted in the refusals
to answer questions "pertinent to the question under inquiry,"
but congressional investigations are generally as broad as inquisitions by officials. If congressional witnesses are entitled to the
detailed right of apprisal which these six cases specify, then subpoenaed witnesses before inquisitional officials should be entitled
on due process grounds to know the nature of the inquiry, as well
as the subject matter about which they are to be interrogated.
Nevertheless, provisions for this kind of a right of apprisal in
administrative investigations are hard to find, although they do
exist. Again the Arkansas State Sovereignty Commission and the
Hawaii Commission on Subversive Activities furnish good examples. The Arkansas act provides:
At least twenty-four (24) 'hours prior to his testifying, a witness shall
be given a copy of that portion of the motion or resolution scheduling
the hearing; . .. at the same time he shall e given0 as statement of
-thesubject matter about which he is to be interrogated.

Comparably, Hawaii requires its commission to adopt proper
rules to provide "(a) That the subject of any investigation be
set forth clearly in advance to witnesses called."0' These provisions, however, constitute rare exceptions. Instead, they should
be the rule, and due process should be held to require it.
Right to a Trans r7ipt
A third due process right which should be accorded an individual subpoenaed before an official inquisitor is that to a copy,
if he wishes it, of any testimony he gives or any documentary
material he supplies. In our industrial and automated day and
age with more mechanical reproducing devices than one can list,
there should be no problem about this.0 0 If the witness can afford to pay for a copy, let him do so; if he cannot, give him a
copy free.
3.

97. 352 U.S. 330 (1957); see Rogge, supra note 19, at 940-41.
98. AnK. SiTA. ANN. tit. 6, § 812 (Supp. 1963).
99. HAwAix REv. LAws ch. 361, § 5 (1955).

100. S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), the bill of Senators Dirksen
and Long, which would rewrite the Administrative Procedure Act, revises

section 6 (b)to provide: "Every person who submits data or evidence shall
be entitled to retain or, on payment of lawfully prescribed costs, procure a
copy or transcript thereof, except as provided by rules prescribed by the
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The only real objection the government can have to this course
is that the witness will remain consistent in his account. But if
his account is accurate, he should remain consistent. If it is not,
let the government prove its errors or falsities by other means
than the mouth of the witness who makes them. As for any other
objections the government may have, the short answer is that
the government should be above any kind of shell game tactics
with the individual.
Again, Supreme Court decisions, this time four in number,
Griffin v. Illinois,'01 Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.,' °' Lane
v. Brown,'0 3 and Draper v. Washington,'0

4

point the way. In

Griffin and Eskridge the Court concluded that indigent defendants in state criminal cases were entitled to a free copy of the trial
transcript where this was necessary for them to "be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough
to buy transcripts."' 0 5 In Draper the Court held that the trial
judge's conclusion that an indigent's appeal was frivolous was
an "inadequate substitute for the full appellate review available
to nonindigents in Washington, when the effect of that finding
is to prevent an appellate examination based upon a sufficiently
Supreme Court governing the procedure required by section 9(a)."
Section 9(a), as revised, limits the imposition of certain sanctions "except
upon a finding of probable cause by twelve or more jurors of a grand jury,
summoned by the district court in the district in which the respondent resides or has his principal place of business." The bill continues:
The district courts shall have authority to summon grand juries having
not less than sixteen or more than twenty-three members, which shall
be separate from grand juries hearing criminal matters, at such times
as the public interest requires upon request in writing by agencies having matters to present to grand juries and pursuant to rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court. Such rules shall be prescribed by the Supreme
Court as soon as practicable and shall not take effect until they have
been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session 'thereof but not later than the 1st day of May,
and until the expiration of ninety days after they have -been thus reported. The release of any information (1) concerning any such grand
jury proceeding until after a finding of probable cause by such grand
jury and notice thereof to the parties, or (2) concerning any nonpublic
investigation by an agency until after the termination of the investigation by the agency with the announcement that it will not commence
any such proceeding, shall be governed by the rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
101. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

102. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
103. 372 U.S. 477 (1963); accord, Cooper v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 23 (1903).
104. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
105. 351 U.S. at 19; 357 U.S. at 216.
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complete record of the trial proceedings themselves." ' 0
Lane v. Brown involved a postconviction proceeding: there
had already been a direct appeal to the state supreme court and
a denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.107 Yet,
because the rules of the Indiana Supreme Court permitted an appeal from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis and for such
an appeal required a transcript of the coram nobis hearing, the
Court held that an indigent was entitled to such a transcript, even
though the public defender, who represented him, was "unable
to find any error or errors that would have any merit to assign
upon an appeal."10
If under these varying circumstances, defendants in criminal
cases are entitled to a transcript or a "sufficiently complete record," then we have reached the point where we can afford to give
a due process right to a transcript as well as a copy of documentary evidence to subpoenaed witnesses in inquisitions by officials.
4.

Right to Immunity from Prosecution

So far we would seem to be on rather firm ground. Now we
enter a more controversial area; for as a fourth due process right
for individuals subpoenaed to appear before inquisitional officials, the author suggests immunity from prosecution for offenses
that the subpoenaed witness testifies about, unless he has knowingly waived his right of silence.1 0 9 This means converting the
Court's ruling in United States 'v. Monia" ° into a due process
right applicable to any type of compulsory testimony provision;
106. 372 U.S. at 499-500.
107. Brown v. State, 239 Ind. 184, 154 N.E.2d 720 (1958), cert. denied,

361 US. 936 (1960).

108. 372 US. at 482 n.10. In Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964),
the Court held that an indigent defendant with a new lawyer on appeal was
entitled to a -ree transcript of his entire trial, so that his new lawyer could

look for plain errors.
109. The Court established the waiver doctrine under Chief Justice Vinson
in the case of Airs. Jane Rogers, who was treasurer of the Communist party
in Denver until 1948. She told about -herself, but refused to identify the
person to whom she had given the party's books, saying, "I don't feel that I
should subject a person or persons to the same thing that I'm going through."
Subsequently she based her -refusalon her right of silence. Chief Justice VrMson
in the Court's opinion told her she had waived it. Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367 (1951); accord, United States v. St. Pierre, 132 Fad 837 (2d
Cir. 1942), cert. granted, 318 U.S. 751, case dismissed as moot, 319 U.S. 41
(1943). A recent waiver case involving an alleged deviant in the labor field
is Presser v. United States, 284 Fa.d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 816 (1961).

110. 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
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and even if there is no such provision. In the Monia case the
Court held that under the older form of compulsory testimony
provision, exemplified by the Compulsory Testimony Act of
1893,"1 a witness obtained immunity from prosecution even
though he had not claimed his right of silence.
In England police officers have to advise accused persons of
their right of silence; but such a course would seem strange to
many of our officials, and there is no point in arguing for it. Indeed, in In re Groban12 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion in which Mr. Justice Harlan joined, all but made fun of
the idea that an individual might not be aware of his right of
silence:
We are not justified in invalidating this Ohio statute on the. assumption that people called before the Fire Marshal would not be aware of
their privilege not to respond to questions the answers -to which may
tend to incriminate. At a time when this -privilege 'has attained the
familiarity of the comic strips, the assumption of ignorance about the
privilege -by witnesses called before the Fire Marshal is too far-fetched
an assumption on which to invalidate legislation."13
Nor is there any point in making a general attack on the constitutionality of compulsory testimony acts. We have had such
acts too long" 4 and the Supreme Court has sustained them too
many times'" for any such attack to be feasible. The author questioned the utility of such acts"' and specifically challenged the
validity of the Immunity Act of 1954,117 one of the acts which
the Court sustained. He again questioned the utility of such acts
in the second installment of this Article." x8 Compulsory testimony
acts have become so much a part of our way of life, however, that
111. 27 Stat. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
112. 352 U.S. 830 (1957).
118. Id. at 337.
114. The author traced the history of such acts in Roaus, Tus FIrST AND
THE F=~'-a 204-11 (1960); Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political
Deviants, 55 MICH. L. R v. 375-83 (1957).
115. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961) (immunity provision
in the Narcotic Control Act of 1956); Reina v. United States, 864 U.S. 507
(1960) (same); Brown v. United States, 859 U.S. 41 (1959) (Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1950) (Immunity

Act of 1954); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (Compulsory Testimony
Act of 1893).
116. RosGE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 269-73; Rogge, supra note 114, at
404-11.
117. ROGGE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 215--28.
118. Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of Due Process Requirements in Administrative Investigations-II, 48 MrN. L. REv. 557, 577-78

(1964).
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with one qualification,

the validity of the clause that became current with the Securities
Act of 1933, 11 and under which a subpoenaed individual has to
claim his privilege against self-incrimination before obtaining
immunity from prosecution.

Recently a joint resolution of Congress" 0 gave inquisitional

subpoena powers to the presidential commission, headed by Mr.

Chief Justice Warren, to investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The joint resolution passed the Senate

unanimously on December 9, 1963, =1t and the House in like man-

ner on the following day.2 2 The measure would have passed the
country at large with almost equal unanimity. It contained a
compulsory testimony provision of the type which became current with the Securities Act of 1933: a subpoenaed individual can
obtain inimunity from prosecution only "after having claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination." m Even this type of immunity provision was considered too favorable for subpoenaed
witnesses, for under the joint resolution any member of the Commission as well as any agent or agency designated by it could
take testimony, and thus presumably confer immunity from
prosecution' 4
119. 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77v(c) (1958).

120. SJ. Res. 137, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. P c.22639-40, 22787
(daily ed. Dec. 9, 10, 1963).
121. SJ. Res. 137, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., 109 CONG. R.c. 22639 (daily ed.
Dec. 9, 1963). 122. SJ. Res. 137, .88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. PLsC. 22787 (daily ed.
Dec. 10, 1963).
123. SJ.Res. 137, 88th Cong., 1st Seas., 109 CONG. R c. 22640, 22787
(daily ed. Dec. 9, 10, 1963).
124. The joint resolution gave its inquisitional subpoena powers to the
Commission or any of its members "when so authorized by the Commission."
But: "The Commission, or any member of the Commission or any agent or
agency designated by the Commission for such purpose, may administer oaths
and affirmations, examine /witnesses, and receive evidence." This caused Congressman George Meader from Michigan to comment:
-I would like to ask the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
fiist, if it has not been the Jong-standing policy of the Committee on
the Judiciary not to adopt legislatibn authorizing the Attorney General
to "rant imminity to witnesses; and, second, if this immunity to witnesses is exercised bythe Commissiofi, that it is the hole of our Comnittee on the Judiciary that it will be exercised wholly as Commission
action and not by any one member of the Commission or any agent
designated by the Commission.
S.J. Res.137, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 Co'NG. Rc. 22788 (daily ed. Dec. 10,
1963).
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But if the privilege against self-incrimination is as well known
to subpoenaed individuals as the comic strips, as Justices Frankfurter and Harlan said it was, than it is even better known to
official inquisitors. Let us therefore place upon these officials the
duty of obtaining from a subpoenaed individual a waiver of his
right of silence. Upon their failure to do so, the subpoenaed individual should be immune from prosecution. Let us do this whatever the type of immunity provision, and even if there is no
provision at all. The fact that an inquisitional official is functioning by means of subpoenas (except those of a grand jury or of
legislatures)' 2 5 should be enough, without more, to bring this due
process right into operation. The waiver can be recorded either
at the outset of the transcript or in a separate document. Some
statutes specifically provide for the filing of a written waiver of
one's privilege against self-incrimination. 2 '
An interesting recent case, Jones v. United States, 127 points
in the suggested direction. The government took before a grand
jury an individual against whom it sought an indictment and
questioned him. Although the prosecutor told him that he need
not answer questions, he did not tell him that the grand jury
would use his answers to decide whether to indict him. The District of Columbia Circuit not only reversed his conviction but
also directed the dismissal of the indictment, saying:
We said in 1955: "No doubt it would be a boon to prosecutors if
they could summon before a Grand Jury a person against whom an
indictment is -being sought and there interrogate him, isolated from
the protection of counsel and presiding judge and insulated from the
critical observation of the public. But there is a serious question
whether our jurisprudence, fortified by constitutional declaration, permits that procedure." Powell v. United States. . . .We now answer
this question in the negative. We cannot reconcile that procedure, which
was used in this case, with the Fifth Amendment guarantee that "No
125. In Maryland the House of Delegates of the General Assembly can
act as the grand inquest of the state. The first sentence of § 24 of article 3
of the Maryland Constitution provides: "The House of Delegates may enquire, on -the oath of witnesses, into all complaints, grievances and offences,
as the Grand Inquest of the State, and may commit any person, for any
crime, to .the public jail, there to remain, until discharged by due course of
law." With reference to § 24, Chief Judge Frederick W. Brune of the Maryland Court of Appeals wrote: "Probably the most important investigative
power, other than a grand jury, in this State is the House of Delegates of
the General Assembly .... This power conferred upon the House of Delegates is rarely exercised in practice." Letter to 0. John Rogge, April 24, 1968.
126. See, e.g., Fr. STAT. § 62.4.0121 (1960); N.Y. Ixs. LAw § 25.
127. 327 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."' 2 8

Of course the establishment of a due process right of immunity
from prosecution, absent a waiver, for subpoenaed witnesses in
administrative investigations means that federal immunity provisions that began with the Securities Act of 1933 violate the due
process clause of the fifth amendment; and similar state provisions, violate that of the fourteenth. Yet, legislation can easily
give us a new batch of such provisions.
In short, let the time and, to the extent of answering questions
and producing documentary material, the will of a subpoenaed
individual be subject to the pleasure of inquisitional officials, but
not his life, liberty or property without the due process protections proposed in this Article. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren in
the Court's opinion in Co'ppedge v. United Statos" ' cautioned,
"when society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps.' 0

128. Id. at 4-5; cf. Seals v. United States, S25 F2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1903),

cert. denied, 32 USL. Wnxx 3342 (March 31, 1964), where the court held
that a confession made by an individual who went into an FBI office voluntarily and was told he was free to leave and was not under arrest had to be
excluded from evidence because questioning in a law-enforcement office is
inherently coercive.
199. 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
130. Id. at 449.

